This paper estimates the degree of risk aversion of contestants appearing on Vas o No Vas, the Mexican version of Deal or No Deal. We consider both dynamic agents who fully backward induct and myopic agents that only look forward one period. Further, we vary the level of forecasting sophistication by the agents. We find substantial evidence of risk aversion, the degree of which is more modest than what is typically reported in the literature.
I. Introduction
Attitudes toward risk play significant roles in explaining a vast range of individual choice and behavior. Therefore economists have long attempted to elicit the degree of risk aversion from naturally occurring data sources as well as surveys and experiments in the laboratory and field. Empirical findings are surprisingly dispersed. From a field experiment in India, Binswanger (1981) finds that when payoffs are small, about 50% of individuals are fairly risk averse while a third of subjects are risk neutral or risk loving over small stakes. Using financial market data, Hansen and Singleton (1982) find that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is near 1. In a laboratory experiment, Holt and Laury (2002) find that 81% of subjects are risk averse, while 13%-29% are risk neutral and 6% are risk loving. For about 60% of their subjects, the coefficient lies between 0.15 and 0.97. Chetty (forthcoming) infers risk preferences from labor supply behavior and finds the coefficient of relative risk aversion ranges from 0.15 to 1.78 with an average of 0.71.
Using a set of hypothetical lottery questions in the Health and Retirement Study, Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) also find substantial heterogeneity in risk tolerance.
Using similar questions in the German Socio-economic Panel, Dohmen, Falk, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2005) estimate the constant relative risk aversion coefficient and find that it mostly lies between 1 and 10 but there is a non-negligible mass for higher values up to 20.
A variety of game shows also provide natural experiments on risk attitudes; refer to Gertner (1993) for Card Sharks, Metrick (1995) for Final Jeopardy!, Hersch and McDougall (1997) for Illinois Instant Riches, Beetsma and Schotman (2001) for Lingo, Fullenkamp, Terino, and Battalio (2003) for Hoosier Millionaire, and Hartley, Lanet, and Walker (2005) for Who Wants To Be A Millionaire (2005) . Despite of the possibility that participants in these game shows are not representative of population, the advantage of using data from game shows is that we can recover risk preferences more accurately because they are not only comparable to a well-controlled laboratory environment but involve large stakes (Kachelmeier and Shehata 1992) . These game show studies also find a relatively wide range of risk preferences.
This paper provides further information regarding risk preferences by examining individuals' gambling decisions in a popular Mexican television game show, Vas o No

Vas.
1 This game show is well-suited to our agenda due to its simple and clean setting.
The show is particularly attractive because it is the game of pure luck and individual decisions that solely depend on contestants' preferences while other shows somehow require intellectual ability. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we briefly explain the game show. Section III presents our estimation strategy to recover risk preference parameters in standard utility functions. Section IV discusses our findings and compare with previous findings, including concurrent papers that examine variants of the game in other countries. Section V concludes.
II. The Game Show
Our data are from "Vas o No Vas", the Mexican version of the television program "Deal or No Deal" which airs in many countries around the globe. The format of the show is similar in each market, but there are slight variations. In the Mexican version, once a contestant is selected from the audience, 26 models appear with identical briefcases. Each briefcase contains a sheet specifying an amount of Pesos. The distribution of amounts is common knowledge, but the contestant, host, and models do not know the contents of any briefcase. Table 1 gives the denominations in the briefcases.
At the first stage the contestant selects a single brief case which is set aside. This is the only briefcase from which the contestant can collect the amount of money inside. The game then proceeds to a series of rounds. In the first round, the contestant selects six of the remaining 25 briefcases. These six briefcases are opened, revealing the amounts inside which the contestant will not collect. At this point the "bank", who also does not know the contents of any briefcase, makes an offer. 2 The contestant can decide to end the game and take the offered amount or continue playing the game. If the contestant chooses to continue, another five briefcases are selected, their contents revealed and a new offer is generated. This process continues with the revelation of four then three then two briefcases. Beginning in the sixth round a single briefcase is selected each round. In the 1 A variant of this show is now airing in the U.S. under the name Deal or No Deal. 2 The only one who knows the contents of each briefcase is the government official who was in charge of filling the briefcases and he plays no role in the show. This is an important feature of the game because the bank can strategically make offers if it knows the value of the held briefcase and contestants should take it into account for their decisions. Without this kind of complication it is easier to elicit risk aversion from participants' decisions in the Mexican show.
ninth round, there are only two active briefcases, the original one set aside and one other.
If the contestant rejects the bank's offer, the original briefcase is opened and the contestant's payment equals the amount revealed. Regardless of outcome, the show concludes with the contestant being presented an oversized check.
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The data were collected from the television network's website. 4 In most cases the show summary provides a complete description of the peso amount revealed and the offers made each round. However, in some cases a complete record is not provided and those episodes are omitted from our analysis.
III. Data Analysis
To determine the optimal choice, consider the decision a contestant would face in the final round. 
where f(O ij ) denotes the probability distribution of the offers that would be made if briefcases i and j are the only active briefcases. Likewise, in the seventh round, the expected utility of continuing is given by: 3 This feature differs from some other contests where the recipient only receives the large novelty check for winning large prizes. Fullenkamp et al. (2003) point out that such a presentation may influence behavior. 4 The show summaries can be viewed at www.esmas.com/vasonovas. The data was collected from the first 62 shows televised in Mexico in 2005 and 2006 . As seen in Table 1 , during this time, the format of the show changed with respect to the money amounts in the 26 briefcases. The analysis considers this formatting change to be exogenous. The data used in the analysis are available from the authors upon request.
Iterating this process gives the comparison faced by a participant at any round. In analyzing behavior we consider four types of participants that differ along two dimensions. The first dimension pertains to how the participant believes the offers are generated in future rounds, these beliefs are either sophisticated or naïve. Those we term "sophisticated" participants anticipate that the future offer is based not only upon the expected value of the active briefcases, but the variance. In addition, we assume that they know that the offer depends on round since the broadcasters and advertisers want the game to last for the entire time slot building suspense as it goes and, as a result, the offer is pretty small in the earlier phase. We assume that sophisticated participants estimate the following double-log offer function for forecasting: where n B and SD n denote average and standard deviation of the monetary values in the n active briefcases. We assume that participants estimate the natural logarithm of offer to ensure that the predicted offer is positive. The sample includes all the offers made at every round in the shows we examine except for one show in which an exceptionally generous offer was made at Christmas. All the estimates of this sophisticated offer function are significant at the 5 percent significance level. The high R 2 reflects the notion that the offer is quite predictable. The estimates are consistent with our expectation. The offer is higher when the expected value of the remaining briefcases is higher and/or when the standard deviation is lower. The offer also increases when there are fewer briefcases left. Figure 1 plots the predicted and actual log offers. 5 We also assume that sophisticated contestants consider the uncertainty regarding their point prediction. To account for this, we assume that they use the prediction error from the estimation to determine the distribution of offers, the f(·) in equation (1) and (2).
Assuming that the error term related to equation (3) follows a normal distribution, we estimate its standard deviation. For computational convenience, we discretize the support of the distribution of the predicted offer, symmetrically around the mean, into seven intervals and assign the cumulative probability to the corresponding point in each interval. 6 On the other hand, we assume that "naïve" participants simply expect that future offers will be the average of the values in the active briefcases, that is
The second dimension is the degree to which participants are forward looking. The "dynamic" participant reasons through the ramifications of a decision to the game's end, as we described in equation (1) and (2). On the other hand "myopic" participants only look one period ahead, treating the next period's offer or distribution of offers depending on sophistication as the value of arriving at that stage of the game. In the example for the seventh round, this simply amounts to replacing
By seeing if a person chose to continue or stop the game, we observe only a bound on their risk attitude. In general, though not always, offers are below expected value of the remaining briefcases. Therefore, generally speaking if a person opts to continue they are not too risk averse and, if they opt to stop, they are not too risk loving. Hence, for individuals who do not go all the way, we can estimate both the upper and lower bound on their risk preferences, while we only know the upper bound for those who go all of the way. 7 We consider two standard forms for the utility function: Constant Relative Risk person with a given parameter value. In the earlier rounds offers are very low presumably in an effort to keep the show going. Evidently, this strategy was successful as no one ever chose to take the offer in the first three rounds.
IV. Behavior in High Stakes Lotteries
This section presents a discussion of our findings. Using our methodology we have four categories of contestants. The first category includes those who accept an offer and have bounded risk preferences. The second includes those who are not consistent with any risk parameter value. That is, these subjects accept an offer indicating that they are more risk averse than a previous rejection that has indicated that they must be less risk averse than. The third category includes contestants that never accepted an offer and thus could be extremely risk loving. The fourth group includes those we cannot identify as being in one of the first two groups due to computational limits and the possibility that their behavior is consistent at extreme parameter values beyond our parameter range.
In general we observe similar levels of risk aversion as those reported in previous studies. While we find considerable variation in risk attitude boundaries, many of the participants behaved in a manner consistent with mild risk aversion. It is encouraging to note that only for a small fraction of people could their behavior not be explained by some level of risk aversion. We first present the results for CRRA and then present the results for CARA. A comparison with previous work is then offered. The baseline case we present is for sophisticated dynamic agents. For 36 of the 52 participants we could estimate both lower and upper bounds on their risk parameters r, of which four were inconsistent. Fourteen of the contestants never accepted an offer and only for two of the subjects no bounds could be identified. This information is presented in Table 2 for all three wealth levels. Table 3 and Figure 2 provide the basic results for the 46 usable contestants (i.e. those for whom we could identify two consistent bounds and those that never accepted an offer). Table 3 presents the mean, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, and number of observations for the upper bound, the lower bound conditional on being observed, and the midpoint conditional on being observed. Figure 2 plots the possible range of r for each participant.
The highest possible value of r that any of these participants could have is 3.905. In fact only four participants (9%) could have r > 2, suggesting that we do not see much evidence of "extreme" risk aversion. On the other hand we do see evidence that at least a few subjects are extremely risk loving. The lowest upper bound we identify is -4.675 and five contestants (11%) must have r < 0. For the 32 participants that we could identify consistent upper and lower bound, the average midpoint of the parameter interval is 0.475, indicating that overall there is a mild degree of risk aversion. 26 of these 32 contestants (81%) must be risk averse, as indicated by intervals that lie completely above r = 0 in Figure 2 , while only 1 must be risk loving. For the 14 with no observed lower bound, four (29%) must be risk loving. Following Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) , if one assumes that risk parameters are normally distributed the maximum likelihood estimate 9 W L is computed using the 2002 GDP per capita from the OECD converted into pesos by using the official exchange rate data from the Central Bank of Mexico for that year. W H is extracted from Loyola (2002).
of the mean based on the bounds of the 46 usable participants is 0.608. However this estimate is not statistically different from zero at the 10 percent significance level.
As mentioned earlier we relax the assumption of sophisticated dynamic contestants in two ways. One is what we term "myopic," in which the subjects only look one period into the future. The other is what we term naïve in which case the expected offer is simply the expected value of the contents of the active briefcases. This would suggest that we are considering four models; however, as it turns out the naïve offers are such that a dynamic person who can consider the possibility of continuing past the next period anticipates stopping next period to be optimal and thus is indistinguishable from a myopic naïve agent. Therefore, we have only two alternative specifications; sophisticated myopic and naïve.
As indicated by Table 2 , allowing agents to be myopic and at the same time sophisticated in their offer beliefs is unappealing. With this specification we find that 11 subjects are not consistent with any value of r and we cannot determine consistency for 22 others. Essentially with this specification in early rounds where there is considerable variation, the participants expect low offers given their level of sophistication but do not consider the better future offers that will subsequently result as the variance decreases.
When these participants continue it seems as though they are forgoing a relatively good offer in exchange for something they expect to be bad indicating risk loving preferences.
Stopping suggests that the subjects are not too risk seeking, but given our computational limits we are unable to determine if the behavior is inconsistent or these participants have consistent preferences.
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Assuming that agents are naïve, there are 8 unidentified contestants but only 1 that is clearly inconsistent, as shown in Table 2 . Under this model, we see a marked increase in the amount of risk aversion. Of those from whom we observe upper and lower bounds, the average midpoint increases to 2.636, see Table 3 . The maximum r that we observe could be as high as 13.98, and 10 of the 43 usable contestants (23%) are sufficiently risk averse such that r > 2. In fact, as shown in Figure 3 , all of the contestants could have a 10 The maximum prize is 5,000,000 and thus r < -12 results in the need to compute (5,000,000+W)
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, which creates an overflow error. Therefore, it could be that stopping indicates a constant's r is below -13.5, which is consistent with previous decisions indicting that r is less than -12 or it could be inconsistent with previous decisions indicating r is above -13. positive r. For this specification the maximum likelihood estimate of the mean of r is 1.076, which is statistically different from zero at the five percent confidence level.
The effect of our wealth choice is also demonstrated in Tables 2 and 3 . By definition, increasing wealth makes a person making the identical decision appear more relatively risk averse. But it does not appear that the wealth assumption changes the results substantially.
The Level of Risk Aversion with CARA.
The results for CARA are summarized in Tables 4 and 5 and Figures 4 and 5. The basic conclusions are similar to the CRRA case. Again we find evidence of mild risk aversion in our sophisticated dynamic specification. The average midpoint for contestants for whom we could identify both bounds in 6×10 -7 , see Table 5 . Twenty six of the 46 usable contestants (57%) must be risk averse, while only one must be risk loving, see Figure 4 . From Table 5 , the highest possible σ we observe is 1.98×10 -5 and the lowest σ that at least one contestant must have is -5.9×10 -6 .
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As evidenced in Table 4 by the large number of inconsistent and unidentified contestants, the myopic sophisticated model is again unappealing. 12 However, the naïve model is reasonable. With this specification, the contestants appear more risk averse as a group, with the average midpoint shifted up to 4.8×10 -6 . The maximum possible σ becomes 7.35×10 -5 and 31 of the 49 usable contestants (63%) must be risk averse.
With this specification, five of the contestants (10%) must be risk seeking, see Figure 5 .
It is interesting to note that this is greater than the percentage of contestants who must be risk loving in the sophisticated dynamic model.
Comparison with Other Studies.
As mentioned earlier, there are four concurrent studies using data from offers as a percentage of expected value for each round.
14 As in our model, Bombardini and Trebbi assume that contestants take forecasting errors into account. However, they assume that contestants do not take into account the variance of the active briefcases, which we have found to be a significant factor impacting offers. Similar to our approach, De Roos and Sarafidis employ a regression approach to describe how contestants predict future offers. They assume that contestants base their forecasting on the mean and the standard deviation of the remaining briefcases for each round, but they do not consider forecasting errors. Trying to bound risk preferences, both studies ignore an extra incentive from "Chance" or "SuperCase" which is a special feature of the Australian show. Also both include "inconsistent" contestants for estimation.
Bombardini and Trebbi find that, for the Italian show participants, the CRRA coefficient is typically between 3.41 (static) and 3.15~4.03 (dynamic) when annual labor income multiplied by 10 is used for the initial wealth. The estimates are quite sensitive to the wealth level; under the dynamic model, they find 0.43~0.51 at the zero wealth and 1.08~1.37 with the wealth being the annual income. Despite the fact that the coefficient is on average significantly larger than zero, Bombardini and Trebbi find a large degree of heterogeneity in risk preferences. They also report that 4%-6% of participants are inconsistent, a slightly smaller percentage then we observed.
The results of Post et al. are most comparable to ours because of the similarity in show formats and similarities in methodological approaches. They find that the CRRA coefficient ranges from 1.15 (wealth = 0) to 6.68 (wealth = annual income), which are higher than our estimates. The estimates become slightly lower under the myopic model.
Like the other studies, they also find a non-ignorable mass of inconsistent behaviors (15% of participants).
Only two other studies estimate the CARA parameter. (approximately US$442,000). Complete information is provided regarding the possible prizes, the offers the contestant faces, and the actual decisions of the contestant. The ability to cleanly observe behavior in high stakes situations, explains why several researchers are focusing on this game shows.
In general, we find substantial evidence of risk aversion in both the CRRA and CARA specifications. However, the degree of risk aversion is typically more modest than what has been reported by previous researchers. One possible explanation for this difference is that Mexico is a developing country and economic development may change people's risk attitudes through various channels from life expectancy at the micro level to economic vulnerability at the macro level. We hope our study encourages more crossculture comparative studies. We also find a considerable variation in risk attitudes, with a few people being extremely risk averse while others are risk loving. Ultimately, only a small percentage of people were found to be inconsistent with any reasonable level of risk aversion in either the CRRA or CARA specifications. More studies are required to determine if these inconsistent behaviors are simply random mistakes or due to the analytical limitation of the classical expected-utility framework. Notes: Mid points removed for the shows that went all the way or for which we do not find a lower bound (show17).
